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This Article explores what authorship and creative production
mean in the digital age. Notions of the author as the creator of the
work have, since the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1 710, provided a
point of reference for recognizing ownership rights in literary and
artistic works in conventional copyright jurisprudence. The role of the
author as both the creator and the producer of a work has been seen as
distinct and separate from that of the publisher and user. Copyright
laws and customary norms protect the author's rights in his creation,
and provide the incentive to create. They also allow him to appropriate
the social value that his creativity generates as recognition of his
contribution towards society. By initially protecting the rights of
authors in literary and artistic works as a property right, copyright
laws have facilitated market transfers of private rights and directed
use of these works toward the most socially beneficial uses. This
Article proposes that in the digital age, when users of literary and
artistic works are increasingly becoming authors themselves, the notion
of authorship provides a mark of identification to connect the original
author with the work in a market characterized by an abundance of
derivative works and remixes of original content. The notion of
authorship in the digital age attributes individual and collaborative
contributions to the collective pool of information back to their
respective authors. This Article proposes that the networked economy
J.S.D., Stanford Law School, 2004; J.S.M., Stanford Law School, 2001; LL.M.,
University of Cambridge, Clare Hall, 1996; LL.B., University of London, 1995. The author
thanks the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law for inviting her to present
this Article at the Drawing Lines in the Digital Age: Copyright, Fair Use and Derivative Works
Symposium in October 2009. The author also thanks the editors of the Journal for their excellent
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may be sustained in a world where digital technologies facilitate the
free flow of information if good works of authorship are rewarded by
attributing the original author, and authentic works of authorship by
responsible authors become an expected norm. Recognizing authorship
and protecting ownership rights in the digital age, where open
platform technologies and peer production create a plethora, rather
than a paucity, of literary and artistic works, are simple and cost-
effective ways for the law to address this question of sustainability.
The notion of authorship as a right of ownership in literary and
artistic works acknowledges the moral and ethical components of
communal and collaborative production. This Article suggests that
recognizing authorship and protecting ownership rights in literary and
artistic works in the digital age promotes, rather than restrains,
creative activity.
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The Internet network design commonly known today as Web
2.0 facilitates online collaboration, information sharing, and the
interoperability of different standards.' A culture of consuming and
remixing data has grown around an architecture supporting web-
based communities, social networking sites, blogs, wikis, and
collaborative projects. 2  Such a culture has created a plethora of
1. Richard Paul & Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New Cyberworld: The Employer's Guide to
the Interactive Internet, 24 Lab. Law 109 (2008) ('The phrase "Web 2.0" was coined to describe
this latest generation of Web-based inter-activity, relationship-building, and user-generated
content. Web 2.0 refers to Web software that is continually and collaboratively updated by
Internet users. This includes Web sites, Web applications, or Web services that allow users to
create content, control content, or interact and collaborate with one another.")
2. Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for User
Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 929 (2009) ("In the past, it was far more
difficult to see the creativity of thousands, if not millions, of people. The social networking
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creative content from an untold variety of sources, as users of creative
content engage in remixing and reproducing creative works. 3 As
communal collaboration and collective ownership of creative
production increase because of the networks that the Internet has
created,4 there is increasing commentary and scholarship on the users
of such content. 5 The shift from more conventional scholarship on the
place of the autonomous author in the copyright system to the user is
an interesting one.6 As web applications allow for collaborative and
interactive remix and reproduction of creative works in a
decentralized fashion, users of creative works are no longer passive
consumers of content. Instead, they have become producers of
creative works themselves, a role that is, in the analog world, solely
that of the author. The copyright system in the analog world serves to
platforms at the heart of the Web 2.0 revolution have changed this. Web 2.0 technologies brought
broader visibility to the creative self-expression of the average person, and in doing so
reproduced already-existing forms of everyday cultural creation.")
3. Marco Iansiti & Greg Richards, Six Years Later: The Impact of Evolution of the IT
Ecosystem, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 705, 708 (2009) ("Web 2.0 applications have enabled the formation
of online communities of end users that produce and manage enormous amounts of shared, user-
generated content. More than just providing a substitute way of creating and delivering
traditional software applications, such as email and calendaring, Web 2.0 transforms the way we
use computers to produce, share, and consume information through Internet-hosted,
collaborative applications".).
4. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together and
the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343 (2008) (analyzing the Internet through
network formation theory and arguing for the continued integration of networks and systems
into an interoperable Internet).
5. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 561-62
(2000) ("Technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization
by enabling small groups of constituents and individuals to become users-participants in the
production of their environment-rather than by lightly regulating concentrated commercial
mass media to make them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers."); Julie E.
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (stating
that while copyright is a law of authors' rights, "[a] theory of authors' rights must be informed by
the theory of the user" as a recipient of copyrighted works and as a new author); Robert P.
Merges, The Concept of Property in the Digital Era, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1239, 1242-43 (2008)
(describing "digital determinism" as a scholarly trend for IP policy that protects "network
friendly policies for a network-dominated world," of which one focus is the "viewers and
consumers of works" as "users").
6. For literature addressing the notion of authorship, see MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND
THE MARKET (1994); Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service
20th Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, Tuesday April 10, 2007, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2008)
(arguing that the author is rightly placed at the center of the copyright system); Oren Bracha,
The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American
Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008) (arguing that authorship is an ideology from which society
constructs reality); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293 (1992).
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connect authors with their readers through the market.7 It also allows
authors to recover payment for the provision of literary and artistic
works to the reading public.8 This Article suggests that, in the digital
world, the copyright system serves a different function-to ensure that
the integrity of the original creator of the work is protected and
respected in a world where content can be easily reproduced without
the consent or approval of the original author. In order for authors to
continue to produce works for society to enjoy, the conditions
necessary to encourage authorship must be protected. 9  This is
particularly so in the digital environment where unauthorized uses of
works undermine authorial rights in literary and artistic works and
could therefore threaten the conditions that sustain creative
authorship*10
Copyright laws protect creative works as property of the
copyright owner as a carefully calibrated set of exclusive rights.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act spells out these exclusive rights as
7. Paul Goldstein, Copyright and Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1992, at 80 (1992) ("Copyright, in a word, is about authorship .... .By
'authorship' I mean authors communicating as directly as circumstance allows with their
intended audiences. Copyright sustains the very heart and essence of authorship by enabling
this communication, this connection. It is copyright that makes it possible for audiences-
markets-to form for an author's work, and it is copyright that makes it possible for publishers
to bring these works to market.").
8. Id.
9. Id. ("Copyright, in a word, is about authorship. Copyright is about sustaining the
conditions of creativity that enable an individual to craft out of thin air, and intense, devouring
labor, an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen Kane. Authorship... implies not just
an author, but an audience, not just words spoken, but individuals spoken to.").
10. The conditions that sustain creative authorship should extend beyond the protection
of pure economic interests. In non-moral rights jurisdictions, such as the United States, the
rights of the author in the work he creates are essentially economic rights to make
reproductions, derivatives, distribute, publicly perform and display, and digitally transmit in the
case of sound recordings (although there is protection of moral rights in specific situations in the
U.S.-the Visual Artists Rights Act, embodied as §106A in the U.S. Copyright Act, recognizes
and protects the moral rights of integrity and attribution of authors of a work of visual art) . See
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (holding that the rights an author has in the work is
provided for solely by statute). However, conceiving of the author's rights as solely originating
from the Copyright Act undermines an important idea about the production of creative works:
that of authorship and the expression of creative individuality contained in each work. For
commentary on this issue, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The
Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006) (explaining how
creativity may be characterized by spiritual or inspirational motivations rather than purely
commercial incentives); Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating Entitlements
in the Copyright System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413 (2009) (suggesting
that emphasizing market rewards as the primary incentive for creativity in copyright
jurisprudence may undermine the author's intrinsic need for authentic expression); Michelle
Brownlee, Note, Safeguarding Style: What Protection is Afforded to Visual Artists by the
Copyright and Trademark Laws?, 93 COLUM. L. REV 1157 (1993) (arguing that the copyright
system should protect the visual artist's "style").
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the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivatives of the work,
distribute the work, publicly perform the work (by way of digital audio
transmission in the case of sound recordings), and publicly display the
work.1" The exclusivity that these rights provide serves as a
commercial incentive to produce and as an economic reward for
creativity. 12 Exclusive rights provide copyright owners with a clear
baseline right to exclude non-paying members of society from using
the work in ways that the Copyright Act specifically sets out.13 These
statutorily enumerated rights facilitate consensual transfers of clearly
defined entitlements in literary and artistic works for payment.' 4 The
entitlements are transferred to the party who values the right most, in
the form of a Coasean bargain, to allow market transactions to occur. 15
The idea behind statutorily-recognized property rights in literary and
artistic works is a manifestation of classical law and economic thought
on cost-benefit forms of legal analysis-in order to encourage
authorship and increase public welfare, authors must be paid with
exclusive rights for their work. 16 This payment encourages authors to
create and commercialize their works on the market.17  The
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
12. For an account of the philosophy behind the incentive and reward paradigms of
intellectual property, see Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen,
122 HARV. L. REV. F. 81 (2009).
13. Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083, 2123 (2009) (discussing baseline rights for exclusion for intellectual property and
explaining that exclusive rights in intellectual property are "necessarily artificial" as intellectual
property lacks the physicality of tangible property for the physical delineation of exclusivity:
"[o]ne difference among land, chattels, and intangibles is that the exclusion strategy is easier to
carry out for tangible property. The baseline is clearer: in the case of land, there is a physical
bubble that corresponds to the module that the exclusion strategy provides. In intellectual
property, by contrast, attempts at exclusion are necessarily artificial").
14. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and fits Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1612-13 (1982) ("[C]opyright
law makes it easy to proceed through consensual market transfer .... The copyright statute...
facilitates the functioning of the consensual market in four ways: it creates property rights,
lowers transaction costs, provides valuable information, and contains mechanisms for
enforcement." (citations omitted)).
15. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 590
(1988) (explaining that the preference for clearly defined legal rights, or "crystals," among legal
academics in the 1980s was attributable to the fact that "precise entitlements facilitate the
efficient allocation of goods; they allow us to identify right-holders and to organize trades with
them until all goods arrive in the hands of those who value them most").
16. RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 11-15 (Edward Edgar Publ'g
Ltd. 2000).
17. Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 16-23 (1995) (discussing the various aspects of commercialization and stating that
"[t]he Copyright Act reserves these money-making activities to the copyright owner by granting
the owner the right to prevent others from engaging in these acts. It is this potential to earn
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assumption behind a law and economics approach to the copyright
system is that an author will only decide to create a work when the
author is assured that the expected market revenue from sale of the
work exceeds his cost of expression.18
However, the incentive and reward were not intended to
benefit the creator but rather to increase the availability of creative
works and thereby enhance the public welfare. 19 It was indeed a
reflection of the law's conventional position on literary and artistic
rights when Justice Reed remarked that
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
2 0
The necessity of encouraging the creation and dissemination of
literary and artistic works for the public has long been the cornerstone
justifying the protection of creative works as private property of the
copyright owner, a necessary "evil" that society, "for the sake of the
[common] good," bears in order have a supply of "good books" for
learning that are the products of "literary labor. '21 The ability to
recover the cost of production and dissemination of literary and
artistic works was necessary for authors to continue to produce works
for society, and it appears that writing for commercial remuneration
drove many authors to write as professionals. 22
However, the diverse forms of content produced and
disseminated today through the Internet demonstrate that non-
economic factors may drive creators of literary and artistic works,
factors that are independent of the commercial rewards from the sale
of the work through a robust copyright market. 23 The proliferation of
income from the commercialization of new works that presumably motivates authors to put in
the long hours necessary to create those works.").
18. For a discussion on the economics of the copyright system, see William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
19. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
20. Id.
21. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5,
1841), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 309 (Robert P. Merges & Jane C.
Ginsburg eds., 2004).
22. For a description of the copyright market in 18th century Germany, see MARTHA
WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET 35-55 (1994).
23. The copyright market is distinguishable from regular markets for physical or
tangible commodities by the need for clear demarcation of exclusive rights due to the non-rival
and non-exclusive nature of copyrighted works. However, expanding rights into all forms of
creative expression will create market inefficiencies by the dead-weight losses that will result
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community-based content with Web 2.0 shows that the production and
dissemination of creative works may occur without the rights now
considered necessary for revenue generation through what hopefully
an efficient copyright market.
Scholars have often doubted the necessity of copyright in
facilitating creative production. More than four decades ago,
Professor Benjamin Kaplan, in his 1966 James Carpentier Lectures at
Columbia University, suggested that the copyright system and the
controls it imposes on creativity "will appear unneeded" to sectors of
production where integrated systems would provide greater public
access to creative works, and where "the law of the future would lose
patience rather quickly with the mere idiosyncratic withholding of
access."24 Copyright, to Professor Kaplan, was "likely to recede [and]
lose relevance" in the production of works created through some form
of public support.25 Five years later, his former student, Stephen
Breyer, expressed similar sentiments with respect to the copyright
system. 26 Professor Breyer observed that the abolition of the copyright
system would not have much of an impact on the production of most
types of books.27 It may instead benefit the public by reducing book
prices, eliminating transaction costs of seeking permission to copy,
and increasing the circulation of most books that would continue to be
produced in the absence of copyright. 2 In his remark that "the case
for copyright in books rests not upon proven need, but rather upon
uncertainty as to what would happen if protection were removed,"
Professor Breyer adopted the position of a copyright skeptic, doubting
the necessity of a copyright system in encouraging creative
production.
29
Scholars and students of the law should not lose faith in the
copyright system as a system to encourage creativity just because
technological development has made creative works more accessible to
the general public. A copyright optimist ought to think that the
copyright system will continue to be a vehicle to encourage authorship
in the digital age. Scholars and students who study the copyright
due to society's decreasing ability to access works. See, Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and
Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B. U. L. REV. 975, 995-996 (2002).
24. BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 120-21 (1968).
25. Id. at 119-21.
26. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
27. Id. at 313 ("[A] moderate decline in publishers' revenues would probably not produce
a serious loss of production.").
28. Id. at 313-320.
29. Id. at 321-322.
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system have conventionally thought of the copyright system in the
United States as providing economic incentives for authorship. 30
However, in the digital age, as users of creative content become
increasingly empowered to make contributions towards the collective
pool of information and human knowledge-whether through
autonomous or collaborative creation, and whether expressed in
original or remixed form-copyright scholars and students may start
thinking of the copyright system from the perspective of authorial
rights, rather than economic rights, and begin to think of the
copyright system as necessary to provide personal, moral, or other
non-economic incentives for authorship in the digital age. This is
especially important because the ease of accessing and remixing
creative works will require that a work's integrity be preserved and
the author's personality be protected to allow society to verify and
check upon the veracity of a work in an environment when the
abundance of creative works to society necessitates the verifiability of
a work's content and reliability. As the law shifts its focus from
authors and publishers to users, and as conventional understanding of
authorship changes, the way people think about property rights in
creative works and the purposes they serve will have to change in the
same direction, too.
Property rights in the analog world provide a simpler right of
excluding non-paying members of society from using the work. 31 The
tangibility of analog works and the non-trivial costs of making copies
of original content provide authors with greater and more exclusive
control over how their works are used.32 In doing so, these property
rights encourage authors to invest time and money to create and
30. Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright
Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1281 (2003).
[Tihe moral ambivalence towards copyrighted works may stem from a distrust of the
basis for copyright protection. If the sole basis for protecting copyright is the economic
incentive to create, then as soon as a work is minimally compensated, it should fall
into the public domain. Emphasis on the incentive theory may weaken the legitimacy
of copyright holders' claims.
Id.
31. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 792 (2001) (stating that rights of exclusion "provide a baseline against which parties
can establish contracts that specify particular uses of resources").
32. The "physical bubble," which allows exclusion based on the physical attributes of the
work, is more prevalent in works of analog form. For example, it would be more costly to
reproduce a vinyl record or video cassette. Works in MP3 or JPEG formats are significantly less
exclusive because of their digital nature. For a discussion on the right to exclude and the
tangibility of the "thing" excluded, see Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in
Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2123 (2009).
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produce works of authorship. 33 In the analog world, property rights
serve to make abundant what was scarce. In the digital world,
however, property rights in literary and artistic works serve an
entirely different function. In the digital world, property rights may
be needed not to exclude society, but instead to manage the use of
creative resources. When the user is also the producer of new works of
authorship, the market is not characterized by a paucity of literature
and other forms of creative works, but by an abundance of works of
diverse types.34 Here, property rights are not needed to encourage the
production of creative works, as users are continuously producing
works. 35 But, property rights may be needed to sustain the continuous
production of creative works by identifying owners of literary and
artistic works, facilitating transfers of use rights between the original
creator of a work and their users, and protecting the authorial
integrity of authors.
The remaining discussion in this Article is divided into five
parts. Part I explores the conventional notion of authorship in the
analog world. Part II analyzes how that notion of authorship has
changed in the digital world and the implications of that change upon
the conception of rights in the networked economy.36 Part III explores
what it means to protect property rights in literary and artistic works
and suggests that these rights may be important in achieving a
balance between integrity in creativity and responsibility in the use of
these works. Part IV argues that, while it is important for the law to
ensure that social welfare is advanced through the grant of property
rights in literary and artistic works, it is perhaps more important for
the law to ensure that individual rights of authors are protected to
33. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id.
34. Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 101, 112 (2007) (stating that "[tihe amazing diversity of the Internet, with its abundance of
user-generated content, would be impossible" if Internet intermediaries were made liable for
posting infringing content on their sites).
35. Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 937
(2008) (describing how users are willing to generate content that online service providers
harness as their business model).
36. The networked economy is the economic order that is built upon the connectivity of
the Internet that allows phenomenon such as peer production and collaborative projects to occur.
The culture of sharing and collaborating is described extensively by Professor Yochai Benkler in
his book, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS. See YoCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How
SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
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ensure sustained production of creative works in the networked
economy. Individual rights of authors should be curtailed only in
exceptional circumstances. Part V of this Article defends the
copyright system as a system designed to encourage authorship that
extends beyond the production of literary and artistic works to
sustaining individual creativity and authentic forms of authorship.
The conclusion, Part VI, asserts a need to think about the copyright
system differently. Copyright is less of a legal system restricting
development in society and more of a legal system encouraging
authorship in diverse forms. Conceiving the copyright system as
protecting authorial integrity assures sustainability of creative
endeavors in the digital age when users are also authors of literary
and artistic works.
I. AUTHORSHIP IN THE ANALOG WORLD
In the analog world, creative expressions of an author endure
in the form in which they were first created. Works produced are
seldom alterable or manipulable, and if they are, any alteration or
manipulation to a work of authorship will often require great skill,
and be difficult or costly. The continuity in creative production from
the moment of conception of the idea to its full and complete
expression of authorship means that the cost of expression-the cost of
creating the work in terms of the author's time and effort expanded,
rights clearance where necessary, and transactions costs in searching
for and entering into a publishing contract with a publisher-is
usually very high for the author, who invests a great deal of time and
labor in creating a work of authorship in the expectation of recovering
the investment.37 Authorship is essentially an individualistic activity
in that the creator of a work often created alone, or if not alone, with
identifiable co-authors or co-creators. No doubt, authors in the analog
world borrow from existing works, and allow other authors' works to
shape their own work, but they often still retain their individual style
and personality in their work. 38 William Shakespeare, for example,
was influenced by Ovid, Geoffrey Chaucher and Christopher Marlowe
37. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 325, 327 (calling the author's time and effort in
producing the work, and the publisher's cost of soliciting, editing and setting the manuscript in
type, the "cost of expression" in any given work).
38. PARADISE LOST is a poem based on the fall of man and story of redemption in the
Bible. Yet, John Milton's individuality as a blind poet facing a potential death sentence stands
out despite the poem's source of inspiration. For the background to John Milton's work on
PARADISE LOST, see the introduction to JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST xv-xxx (Gordon Teskey
ed., 2005).
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to a large degree, and he borrowed extensively from the Bible. 39
Nevertheless, as an individual author, Shakespeare still maintained a
separate identity as the creator of his own unique works, distinct from
authors of contemporaneous works.
40
Works of authorship in the analog world are usually personal
expressions of the author and are often attributable to the original
creator of the work, primarily because works in analog form are not
easily altered.41 When a literary work in book form is made available
to society, for example, its content is always easily attributable to the
person named as the author because in analog form, a literary work,
as it exists, is traceable to its producer and its content verifiable for
reliability or veracity based on the information that is available about
the author and the publisher of the work. Dissemination of works in
analog form usually has to be done through a publisher, who bears the
costs of printing, binding and distributing copies of the work. 42 The
production and dissemination of a work to society is usually costly
43
and any modification or alteration of the work is significantly reduced
by the medium in which the work is distributed and made available to
society-the integrity of an author's work that is distributed in book
form is better preserved and hence its content more easily verifiable
than when a work is distributed to society in digital format. Due to
the high costs of expression, production, and dissemination, a system
of property rights in literary and artistic works may have been the
most appropriate form of encouragement that the law can provide
authors and producers to facilitate the production and creation of
works for society's benefit when the initial cost of production and
distribution is high. But property rights only served as a mechanism
to provide rights to exclude society from using the work without
paying for it-property rights, in the analog world, were not needed to
provide the vital information about the author and content of a work
39. HAROLD BLOOM, GENIUS: A MOsAIC OF ONE HUNDRED EXEMPLARY CREATIVE MINDS
18-25 (2002).
40. HAROLD BLOOM, SHAKESPEARE: THE INVENTION OF THE HUMAN 6 (1998) ("It cannot
be said that Shakespeare imitated Chaucer and the Bible in the sense that he imitated Marlowe
and Ovid.").
41. It is easier to manipulate data with digital works because technology facilitates
changes to works of authorship. Digital works are likely to be considered less original and
authentic than analog works without the personal mark of the author. See Laura N. Gasaway,
Libraries, Users, and the Problems of Authorship in the Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1193,
1223 (2003).
42. Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 325-237.
43. The costs of production and dissemination would include the initial cost of
expression, which is the cost of the author's time and effort plus the cost of the publisher in
soliciting and editing the manuscript and setting it in type, and the cost of printing, binding and
distributing the work. Id.
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to ensure that the content of works distributed to society are verifiable
for their content, in terms of reliability, accuracy, and authenticity.
Works were received by society for what they were because the
medium in which works were distributed did not facilitate the
production of new content generated by users of the original work.
This is not so with authorship and the creation of literary and artistic
works in the digital age.
II. AUTHORSHIP IN THE DIGITAL WORLD
In the digital world, the conventional modes of authorship and
the self-contained medium in which content is distributed to society
prevalent in the analog world appear to have changed drastically.
With the Internet and digital media, where real world information is
converted to binary numeric form in ones and zeros to form easily
transferrable chucks of data over communication networks, works of
authorship has become more readily alterable and manipulable with
its content less verifiable for its veracity and accuracy simply because
the content may have been altered and redistributed by many users of
a single work. As a result, authorship in the digital world is
characterized by a new culture that is eager to explore what they can
do with the technology available to them, and to create new works,
share them as well as remix original works of authorship that come to
them because technology is available to cut and recombine original
works of many different sorts so that the end product may not
resemble any of the original work that was used. While costs of
alteration and manipulation of original works of authorship are
prohibitive in the analog world, that is not the case with digital
technologies. At a fraction of the original cost of production,44 users of
original works may alter and manipulate portions of an original work
that they choose to. Fan edits of popular motion pictures, such as
Mike J. Nichols's edit of George Lucas's Star Wars Episode I: The
Phantom Menace that came to be known as the "Phantom Edit,"45 is
just one example of how technology has enabled users to alter and
manipulate the content of original works of authorship. As a result,
authorship of literary and artistic works is characterized by
significantly different qualities in the digital age. In the digital age,
authorship is generally communal, in that an author usually creates a
44. J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 69 (1997) ('CThe second comer who purchases the originator's product... may
electronically extract and recompile the data in question at a fraction of the originator's
collection and distribution costs.").
45. See Fanedit,org: Home of the Fanedit, http://fanedit.org/49/ (last visited April 2010).
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work as part of a creative community with sometimes-unidentifiable
contributors and supporters.46 Authors readily share their works with
each other and incorporate other works into their own as part of a
remix culture. 47  Works of authorship are also sometimes large
collaborative projects involving multiple contributions from many
different authors-Wikipedia being the quintessential example of a
collaborative project involving more than 91,000 active contributors
working on more than 15 million articles in more than 270
languages.
48
Dissemination of works of authorship produced in the age of
digital media is often accomplished through distribution of the work
on the Internet by the creator of the work, and the need for a
publisher or printer to print and distribute the work is substantially
minimized due to the author's ability to digitally reproduce and
distribute the work at its marginal cost of production, whether the
work in its original form was in a physical or digital medium.49 The
resulting effect on digital technologies upon the environment for
authorship is increased creativity and the production of diverse forms
of literary and artistic works by users of creative works. There are
concerns when users generate new content from original works and
distribute them to society because unless sufficient information is
provided about the new work to allow other users to verify the
accuracy and reliability of the work-since the modified work may not
necessarily represent the contents in its original form nor the
expression of the original author-the veracity of literary and artistic
works will be difficult to verify. In the digital world, therefore,
property rights in literary and artistic works serve a different function
from that in the analog world: property rights may not be needed to
encourage the production of creative works because creators may not
be driven by the possibility of commercial rewards. But, creators who
create because they want to make a contribution to society, would
want to be recognized for the work they have contributed, especially if
46. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369 (2002).
47. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE
HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
48. Id.
49. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1053.
Information is different from ordinary goods because the marginal cost of reproducing
it is so low .... [T]he ratio of fixed to marginal costs is much higher for information
than for other types of goods. That ratio is increasing as the internet makes the
distribution of additional copies of many types of information virtually costless.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the work makes a substantial contribution to the pool of collective
knowledge. And society, in the interest of progress, would want works
that are the most accurate and reliable, especially when there are an
abundance of works and information to choose from. In this situation,
exclusive property rights to the work serves an entirely different
purpose not anticipated when works were produced and distributed in
analog form. Rights, in the digital age, serve to sustain, and not
encourage, authorship in the digital age. To sustain this new mode of
creative production and dissemination in a digital medium, authors
need a mechanism to identify themselves with their individual work
and claim a work as theirs against other variations that may exist,
and society requires a way to assess the veracity of works that are
before them. Rather than serving to encourage creativity-to jump
start an author's creative impulses-as in the analog world, property
rights in the digital age serve to sustain creativity-to make an author
continue to create for society-by connecting authors to their works
and original expressions, informing society of the identity of the
author of a work. The next section explains how property rights serve
to sustain authorship in the digital age in greater detail.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE NETWORKED ECONOMY
A. Sustaining Authorship Through Property Rights
Property rights in literary and artistic works within the
copyright system conventionally mean the set of rights provided for
under § 106 of the Copyright Act.50 These rights "assure contributors
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors."51  The
production and dissemination function of these rights in copyright law
may not be as important in the networked economy because of the
significantly lower costs of producing and disseminating the work.
Where community norms, rather than market incentives, drive the
creation and production of literary and artistic works, the exclusive
rights under § 106 may have a lesser role to play in encouraging
creative and artistic production in the digital age. As economic gains
from the market become less of the reason why authors in the digital
age invest time and money to bring a work to fruition, the exclusive
rights to print, distribute, make derivative works, publicly perform
and display, and digitally transmit lose their influence upon the
creative process. Where creativity occurs for non-economic gains,
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
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exclusive rights that assure authors and copyright owners commercial
rewards from the market become "only one among a number of
expedients for stimulating creativity."5 2 Still, this does not mean that
the foundational conceptualization of copyright laws as a property
right in literary and artistic works completely loses its relevance in
the networked economy. But, the purpose they serve in the copyright
system must change-from one that encourages production to one that
sustains creativity-as society and creative cultures change with
technological development.
The creation of a market for literary and artistic works is still a
product of the copyright system even if the connectivity within the
networked economy appears to render copyright laws less effective.
5 3
Markets for literary and artistic works do not disappear just because
technological development has brought about deep-rooted changes in
the production functions of creative activities. In the analog world,
the copyright system allows efficient market transfers of rights in
literary and artistic works, thereby connecting authors with their
audiences. In the digital world, authors become more connected with
their audience when the audience recognizes its individual
contribution, as authors, to the collective pool of knowledge by those
who use works of authorship in their own work. Due to the abundance
of works in the networked economy, a copyright system should protect
literary and artistic works by providing a mark of authorial
identification through baseline ownership rights in the work. This
recognition of the author for contributions made to collective pool of
creative works available to society for use assures authors of personal
recognition for that contribution, which many non-economic driven
creators seek when making contributions to their community of
creative producers. By providing an ownership right as a mark of
identification of original authorship, users and new authors of literary
and artistic works are able to identify the original author of a work,
obtain permission to incorporate an older work into a newer one, and
provide recognition and attribution where it is due, helping to
facilitate the free flow of information for sustained creativity and
authentic authorship. Property rights will therefore provide a simple
and cost effective way of addressing the sustainability of creative
production by connecting the work with the author, allowing greater
52. KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 122.
53. The relevant market for copyright law is not defined extensively in the literature,
but Professor Sara K. Stadler defines the copyright markets to exclude works that have been
reused or "repurposed" to create works that are complementary, and which do not operate as
substitutes for the original. Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Market for Copyrighted Works, 34 J. CORP.
L. 1059, 1076 (2009).
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authorial control over how the work may be used, and by providing
society with the information it needs to more easily verify the veracity
of a work distributed to many in digital form.
In the networked economy, there may be a shift to protect
individual rights over the collective societal goals of learning and
growth because of the author's changing motivation for creativity. If
altruistic, rather than purely economic, reasons motivate authors in a
networked economy to create works, then the protection of individual
authors' rights is not going to lessen the contributions that these
authors make towards social welfare. Instead, authors motivated by
altruistic ideals, who make their works freely available to society, may
need to have individual rights protected against modification and
alteration of the work that could misrepresent the author's original
expression or mislead society by providing digitally modified or altered
works that contain inaccurate information. If sustained creativity is
to continue in the networked economy. According to Professor Ronald
Dworkin, individual rights are private rights that individuals hold
when there are no collective goals that justify the denial of the rights
or that justify imposition of losses or injury upon the individual
person. 54 Based on Professor Dworkin's definition of what individual
rights are, the rights under copyright law should have a strong anti-
utilitarian flavor because the maximization of the public's interest for
learning and education would be subordinate to the exercise of
individual rights in literary and artistic works. The author's
individual rights should not be undermined in the interest of society
but must be upheld in most situations unless there is reason to
abridge the rights of an individual. The effect of abridging individual
rights may be more detrimental to a legal system than an inflation of
such rights, especially when principles of equal concern and respect
for the individual author justify granting individual rights. An
abridgment of the author's individual rights under the copyright
system undermines the very legal institution that provides ground
rules for a society dependent on authorial creativity for progress and
education. Thus, individual authorial rights should only be abridged
in the interest of the public, when the social cost of an expansion is not
necessary to protect the individual author's right.55
Copyright law has conventionally aimed to provide enough
economic incentive for authors to encourage the creation of literary
54. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92 (1977) (discussing the nature of
individual rights and distinguishing them from collective goals, stating that "[iut follows from the
definition of a right that it cannot be outweighed by all social goals").
55. Id. (stating that, when individual rights give way to collective welfare, "the putative
right adds nothing and there is no point to recognizing it as a right at all").
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and artistic works for public benefit. 56 The foundational assumption
that authors are economically driven to create, however, may be
challenged by the demonstrable proliferation of literary and artistic
works on the Internet, which are motivated by the creator's interest in
being able to participate and contribute to a growing network of
communication and civic engagement that take the form of blogs,
photograph and video sharing sites, and social networks. 57 Copyright
laws recognize authors for the contributions they make through the
production of literary and artistic works for society, and reward
authors for engaging in these activities. 58 But these laws also create a
temporary monopoly that restricts society's ability to use works. 59 The
protection of the author's rights must therefore be balanced against
the need to have building blocks of creativity available to society to
use so that authors and artists have the creative raw materials
necessary to build upon in creating something new. 60 These building
blocks of creativity may be playwright characters, novel plots,
software logic, legal arguments, or ideas that authors use to express
themselves creatively in new ways. 61 The requirements of originality62
and creative expression6 3 in copyright law ensure that the original
author allows these building blocks within the work to remain free
and the courts have found that a system of ruled lines and headings
used for book-keeping,6 4 ideas and themes of plays,6 5 and compilations
56. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
57. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1500-1503 (2008) (discussing the "phenomenal growth" of user generated content).
58. Id.
59. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2002)
("[Tihe authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is
predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative activities of authors,
and that the creative monopoly is a necessary condition to the full realization of such creative
activities." (citations omitted)).
60. Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Software Copyright: Sliding Scale
and Abstracted Expression, 32 Hous. L. REV. 317, 322 (1995).
In copyright, while the law encourages the production and publication of creative
works by giving authors rights in the works they produce, the balance lies in denying
the author many important rights and in completely excluding some significant
material and content from any exclusive control by the individual. The excluded
material provides blocks of available and unprotected material for further creative
work.
Id.
61. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 967 (1990).
62. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1936).
63. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990); Mazer, 347 U.S.
at 214; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
64. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
65. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d. Cir. 1930).
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of factual information,66 for example, do not within the scope of an
author's protectable right. These building blocks for creativity that
fall outside the scope of protectable expression limit the scope of the
author's property right in literary and artistic works, and while non-
protectable components of a work encourage authorship in the analog
world by reducing the need to negotiate for rights to use the work,
they also serve to sustain authorship in the digital world by allowing
parts a work that are merely ancillary to the author's main expression
to be used, remixed, and shared without the need to obtain permission
from the original author. By recognizing that some parts of a work
are non-protectable, a system of property rights provide original
authors with a mechanism to protect their creative expressions and
maintain the integrity and veracity of their work, while offering users
of original work a chance to become authors and creators by using the
building blocks of creativity necessary to generate new content.
B. Facilitating Authorship through the Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is another important legal doctrine in the
copyright system that grants authors the ability to use existing works
to create new ones. At common law, the doctrine allowed courts to
interpret the law in a way that would allow for creativity to occur,
especially in situations where the strict application of the law would
stifle creative efforts.67 The fair use doctrine was statutorily codified
with the 1979 Copyright Act,68 and four non-exclusive statutory
factors were introduced to assist the courts with the analysis of what
may constitute a fair use of a creative work. 69
Courts have been generous with the application of the doctrine,
and have based its application on equity or fairness without
attempting to define its boundaries or limit the application of the
doctrine.70  The Supreme Court case of Sony v. Universal City
Studios, 71 for example, demonstrates the Court's reluctance to
66. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 344.
67. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.
1980).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
69. Under the Copyright Act, these four factors are (1) the purpose and character of the
work incorporating the original, (2) the nature of the original work, (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §
107(1)-(4) (2006).
70. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ('The [fair
use] doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition.").
71. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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interfere with private home uses of copyrighted materials. At a time
when videocassette recorders (VCRs) were new on the market and
private homeowners were using them to record televised broadcasts
for viewing at another time (a technique called time-shifting),
identification of allowable private uses of copyrighted content was a
pertinent issue. 72 The Court decided that to hold time-shifting of
televised broadcasts in the home to be an infringement of copyright
laws would allow the copyright owner to affect and control an
individuals' use of copyrighted works within the privacy of their
homes.73 The Court went on to state that the use of VCRs to time-
shift content was fair use under the law.74 But, more importantly, the
Court decided that, where the private uses of copyrighted content
resulted in minimal economic harm,75 the use was most likely fair.76
The Court's decision demonstrated how the law would respond to an
inefficient copyright market that does not effectively allocate rights in
creative resources between owner and user. Thus, where the
marketplace does not generate socially desirable outcomes, the Court
is willing to assume the role of the efficient copyright market and
allocate rights in the use of creative resources through the fair use
doctrine.7
7
However, in a networked economy, when users are increasingly
authors themselves, the legal dynamics of the copyright system may
have to change. Where the copyright system is primarily concerned
with encouraging the production of literary and artistic works for
public benefit in the analog world, in the digital world, the copyright
system should be more concerned with sustaining creative authorship
of works that will further the goals of the copyright system.
Conventionally, the primary worry in granting rights in literary and
artistic works has been a monopolistic control over creative works by
authors and copyright holders in ways that may restrict public access.
However, in the networked economy, the primary worry for the
copyright system will not be the misuse of rights by authors or
copyright owners . Rather, it is more worrisome that social disrespect
for the process of authorial integrity and authentic works of
authorship in the use and remix of existing works will deter authors
72. See Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling
the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982).
73. Sony, 464 U.S. at 443-46.
74. Id. at 455.
75. In this case, the potential market for the copyrighted content, or its economic value,
was not harmed by the private use of the work. Id. at 456.
76. Id. at 456.
77. See Gordon, supra note 14.
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from fully expressing themselves through individual works of
authorship. Additionally, instead of a concern that society will be able
to benefit from the works of authors, the concern will be whether
authors will have the personal motivation to continue producing new
works if there are no safeguards to protect the author's integrity and
personality contained in the work through various authorial rights,
such as the right to be attributed or the right to protect the integrity
of the work. In the networked economy, there may be a greater need
not only to protect individual authors and their non-economic rights in
literary and artistic works, but also to recognize the moral obligations
that authors and their users owe each other. In the networked
economy, there may be a greater need to achieve a better balance
between those who create literary and artistic works and those who
use the same works to create new ones. The balance that the law will
seek to achieve in the networked economy will no longer be between
incentives and access. Rather, the balance that the copyright system
will aim to achieve in the digital age is between integrity in creation
and responsibility in use of literary and artistic works.
IV. BALANCING PRIVATE RIGHTS AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
The fine line between protection and freedom, property and
access, and integrity and responsibility is based on a legal
demarcation between private rights and public property, or public
domain. Conventional legal and economic literature builds upon the
idea of copyright as a temporary monopoly over intellectual creation
probably from the principle that authors, who labored over the
production of manuscripts, were like farmers, who, having mixed their
labor with the soil, were entitled to property over that which they
labor.78 This labor theory of property rights is perhaps most famously
attributed to John Locke, who believed that a man who removes from
nature that which was originally a part of nature, and who mixes his
labor with it, makes the new thing his property.7 9 The idea that the
author had property in his creation by virtue of having labored in
bringing it forth was so entrenched at common law that no one was
entitled to take another's creative property without his or her
78. See ROSE, supra note 6, at 38; Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright:
The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 504 (2004); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and
Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1540 (1989).
79. JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 20 (Charles L. Sherman ed., 1979).
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permission.80  The financial rewards for authorship through the
recognition of property rights in literature also slowly gained
acceptance with the Statute of Anne in 1710.81 The rights to print and
distribute literature were awarded to encourage authorship, promote
learning 2 and allow public access to works that previously were
inaccessible because of the perpetual control that booksellers had over
the sale of books.
83
What began as an incentive for authorship to flourish later
became a right to recover investments made to produce new works.
The earliest rights to print and reproduce to encourage authorship
continued to expand to include rights of display, adaptation, and
performance, which attach economic value to works and allow authors
to sell their works commercially to the public.8 4  Authors took
advantage of the economic benefit from public sale of works to recover
their investments made in producing works.8 5 As commercial value in
works grows and as investments increase, the rights to economic
exploitation of works become increasingly valuable to encourage
authorship and protect media businesses.8 6 The Copyright Term
Extension Act,8 7 the Digital Copyright Millennium Act,88 and database
protection laws, such as the European Database Directive,8 9 are all
laws that have been enacted to protect commercial, rather than
individual authorial, interests. Advocates for increased rights over
creative works have based their arguments on a property rights theory
that a certain amount of control and exclusivity over property ensured
its social value and encouraged continuous investment in maintaining
80. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 90 (The Penguin Press 2004).
81. HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE: AN ESSAY ON AN ACT FOR THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING, 1710, 105-106 (1956).
82. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 409 (2004).
83. L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USERS' RIGHTS 28-30 (1991).
84. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 298-305 (1996) (discussing the expansion of copyright in terms of duration, personal uses
and transformative uses).
85. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000).
86. LESSIG, supra note 80, at 9.
87. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
88. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
89. Council Directive 96/9, arts. 47(2), 55, 95, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20-28 (EC).
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and improving upon existing works.90 More modern theories within
the realm of law and economics take the argument for private rights
in creative works further by arguing that private property rights are
necessary for preservation and maintenance of the value of the work. 91
The public will overuse works that are free for all to use without the
restraint of private rights, as many will use free resources without
regard for the cost that the use imposes on others, namely the
depletion of natural resources, as in the overgrazing of common
pastures 92 . Garrett Hardin's 1968 article on the tragedy of the
commons has been often used to justify protecting works of authorship
from being part of the public domain. Even though the resource
subject to possible depletion, if commonly held (in Hardin's article,
land), may be protected under a property-type regime, the same
argument has been extended to intellectual works. 93 For creative
works that are non-rival and non-exclusive in nature and hence,
unlikely to be depleted by overuse, the tragedy, it is argued, lies in the
reduction of incentives to create and distribute works. 94
Advocacy for public interest rights of access to creative works,
on the other hand, has always been based on the promotion of learning
in society by ensuring the accessibility of creative works. At the heart
of the public interest argument in favor of restricted copyright is the
90. This stems from a 1968 article written by economist Garrett Hardin suggesting that
commonly held resources will be prone to depletion in a world where individuals acting, in their
best interest, will take as much as possible from commonly held resources without building the
commons. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 37 (describing the increased propertization of
information as the second enclosure of "the intellectual commons of the mind").
91. See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 18-27 (2004) (describing the use of property
rights to protect the value of information goods and transaction costs involved in the
management and enforcement of the rights in these goods).
92. Lemley, supra note 49, at 1037.
The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual property cases is accordingly closely
identified not with common law property rules in general, but with a particular view
of property rights as the right to capture or internalize the full social value of
property. This view draws analytic strength from a branch of law and economics
scholarship that emphasizes the importance of private ownership as the solution to
the economic problem known as the 'tragedy of the commons.'
Id.
93. Id.
94. Deborah Tussey, Ipods and Prairie Fires: Designing Legal Regimes for Complex
Intellectual Property Systems, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 115 (2007)
("[The tragedy of the intellectual commons does not take the form of overexploitation but rather
of reduced incentives for creation or distribution."). Contra Lemley, supra note 49, at 1037-46
('Precisely because its consumption is nonrivalrous, information does not present any risk of the
tragedy of the commons .... The notion that information will be depleted by overuse simply
ignores basic economics.").
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need to have access to information, knowledge, and creative works for
civil discourse to take place within a civil democratic society.95 Many
public interest groups and international organizations have
recognized the important role that information, knowledge, and
creative works play in a community or nation, and have advanced
strong arguments for increased access as a basic human right to
development and growth. 96 The health of the public domain, or the
commons, is the central, theme at the heart of public interest
advocacy. 97 The public domain-that space containing raw materials
for authors to use without incurring liability for infringement-
guarantees that contents may be used by the public for free without
the control of private ownership.98 The public domain however, may
be in danger of being eroded by private property rights.99 Laws and
rules enclosing knowledge, information, and content in the interest of
a few private owners may reduce the amount of raw resources for
authorship in the public domain, and exclude the rest of society from
enjoying a free and healthy commons. The movement to privatize
content that is free for the public to use may threaten the health of the
commons, even though free public use is necessary to encourage
authorship. 100 The movement to enclose private property may further
disrupt the creative processes taking place among authors and may
ultimately destroy the ecology of the public domain. 01
95. See Netanel, supra note 84 (developing a theoretical framework emphasizing
copyright as a state measure to use market institutions to enhance the democratic nature of a
civil society).
96. See Mary W. S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright:
From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775 (2009) (arguing for
copyright law to adopt a normative framework encompassing social and cultural norms on access
to knowledge, development policy, and human rights).
97. Litman, supra note 61, at 968.
To characterize the public domain as a quid pro quo for copyright or as the sphere of
insignificant contributions, however, is to neglect its central importance in promoting
the enterprise of authorship. The public domain should be understood not as the
realm of material that is undeserving of protection, but as a device that permits the




99. See Boyle, supra note 90, at 37-39.
100. The commons has been identified as that area where resources are free, not
necessarily without cost but if there is a cost, it is neutrally or equally imposed. Lawrence Lessig,
Lecture, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DuKE L.J. 1783, 1788 (2002).
101. See Boyle, supra note 90, at 37-39.
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A. The Commons as a Shared Resource
In recent years, there has been increased focus on a much
wider issue that goes beyond merely recognizing the importance of a
public domain. A lot of work is currently being done on developing the
commons as a shared resource for society. 10 2 Common property, such
as libraries, playgrounds, and parks are available for everyone's use in
whichever way one chooses. Likewise, common resources, including
the Internet, spectrum airwaves for broadcasting and wireless
communication, and common knowledge about science, culture, and
our environment should be made freely available to all. The premise
for this argument is that property and resources that are publicly
inherited, jointly developed, and shared must be available to all. 10 3
They also must be actively protected and managed so that the benefits
of these resources are used for the good of all. 104 The expression of the
need to manage the commons for society's collective benefit is
eloquently explained in a weblog, OnTheCommons.org, that is
dedicated to building a movement to manage the commons fairly and
sustainably:
A commons-based society refers to a shift in values and policies away from the market-
based system that dominates modern 'society, especially over the past 30 years. The
foundation of the market is narrowly focused on private wealth, while the commons is
built upon what we all share-air, water, public spaces, public health, public services,
the Internet, cultural endowments and much more. One of the most compelling ideas
being raised today is the possibility of evolving from a market-based society to a
commons-based society. The commons has always been an element of human
civilization. But its central role in sustaining all societies has recently been
rediscovered, inspiring new lines of thinking in fields ranging from high technology to
public health to business. A commons-based society is one that values and protects
commons assets, managing them for the benefit of everyone. Market-based solutions
would be valuable tools in a commons-based society, as long as they do not undermine
the workings of the commons itself. 105
102. Some projects to build and develop the commons include the Science Commons,
http://www.sciencecommons.org (last visited April 2010), Creative Commons,
http://www.creativecommons.org (last visited April 2010), Open Courseware Project,
http://ocw.mit.edu, Open Media Commons (last visited April 2010), http://www.openmedia.org
(last visited April 2010), and Data Commons Project, http://www.geo.coop/node/29 (last visited
April 2010).
103. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) (using economic theory to support the commons as an
open resource that should be made freely available to society).
104. Id. at 918-919 ("For some classes of important resources, there are strong economic
arguments for managing and sustaining the resources in an openly accessible manner . . . [to]
generate value for consumers").
105. On the Commons, What is a Commons-based society?,
http://www.onthecommons.org/content.php?id=2522 (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
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These different sides of the private property/public access
argument cannot be ignored. All present very compelling reasons for
ensuring a healthy and proper environment for authorship and
creativity to flourish. Much more work has to be done, however, to
specifically address the question of authorship and the non-economic
motivation for creativity in the user-author of the networked economy.
There is an undeniable need for at least some rights to encourage
authorship. But, at the same time, these rights cannot restrict the
larger societal need to use works of authorship in the production of
new works. There is indeed a very narrow space between private
rights and public interests-that narrow space between "zero and
one," 106 which requires consideration for the developments that have
taken place within the realm of copyright.
B. The Ideals of the Copyright System
Current copyright debates in international, national, and
regional forums reveal a pressing need to restore balance within the
copyright system.10 7 One way to achieve a balance between private
and public interests in the digital age is to see the copyright system as
a legal institution designed to encourage creative authorship by
protecting the author's integrity. While it is natural, given the
utilitarian slant of the copyright system, to debate the rhetoric of
rights expansion-to encourage innovation and rights reduction in
order to ensure the development of a healthy environment for
creativity and authorship-that debate may offer minimal guidance as
to where the ideals of the copyright system lie. In the heat of this
debate between rights expansion and reduction, scholars, judges, and
policymakers may lose sight of what the law is and the ideals that the
law strives to achieve. Rights under copyright law protect authors as
rights holders in literary and artistic works, and these rights have
106. LESSIG, supra note 80, at 169.
107. Edward L. Carter, Harmonization of Copyright Law in Response to Technological
Change: Lessons from Europe about Fair Use and Free Expression, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 312,
317 (2001) ("Contemporary copyright law... must balance the public interest in fostering societal
progress and learning, including 'education, research and access to information[,]' with other
powerful public interests."); Brett Lunceford & Shane Lunceford, Meh. The Irrelevance of
Copyright in the Public Mind, 7 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 33, 48 (2008) ('The answers to the
questions surrounding copyright do not lie in more draconian legislation that protects copyright
holders. Rather, there must be a reconsideration of the balance between the public policy issues
of protecting private interests and maintaining a robust public sphere."); Christopher Sprigman,
Copyright and The Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317, 319 (2009)
("[Clopyright law must seek a balance between private incentivea to create new works, and
public access to the works created.").
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been granted to create an atmosphere where authorship flourishes. 108
The initial cost to society when these rights were granted to authors in
early copyright statutes was the social cost of a temporary monopoly
over the printing and distribution,109 a consequence of exclusive rights
that the U.S. government clearly recognized. 110  The rights
nonetheless ultimately served a larger social goal, for the monopoly
rights contributed to the production of new works by authors, which
then increased public knowledge as new books and creative works
were produced.'
As private commercial rights expand, greater cost is imposed
upon society because society has less access to creative works.
However, increased social cost due to the exercise of rights by
copyright companies to protect commercial interests should not be a
reason for curtailing the rights of authors under the copyright system
simply because access to works has become more costly as industrial
practices of copyright owners restrict access to works and increase
costs to obtain user rights. The effect of not expanding rights,
however, has a more adverse effect on the copyright system because it
would suggest that rights in literary and artistic works are of little
108. According to Professor Kaplan,
[C]opyright tends also to serve the material expectations and psychological cravings of
the individual creative worker: it gives him an opportunity (though by no means the
certainty) of reward for his efforts; conventional recognition for the feat of creating a
work; a means (though not a very good one) of preserving the artistic integrity of the
work through controlling its exploitation.
KAPLAN, supra note 24, at 75.
109. But see Stan. J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh
In on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435,
441 (2005) ('CThough it is not ideal, a copyright provision that results in a monopoly output level
still is likely to produce a positive value for society compared to no production at all. If copyright
induces creation of works, society benefits from the production of copies of this title ... .
110. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.
A copyright, like a patent, is 'at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits
bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to
further efforts for the same important objects.'
Id. (citation omitted).
111. Barbara Ringer, U.S. Register of Copyrights, Bowker Memorial Lecture: The
Demonology of Copyright (Oct. 24, 1974), reprinted in MODERN COPYRIGHT FUNDAMENTALS 24-25
(Ben H. Weil & Barbara Friedman Polansky eds. 1985).
I believe it is society's duty to go as far as it can possibly go in nurturing the
atmosphere in which authors and other creative artists can flourish. I agree that the
copyright law should encourage widespread dissemination of works of the mind. But it
seems to me that, in the long pull, it is more important for a particular generation to
produce a handful of great creative works than to shower its school children with
unauthorized photocopies or to hold the cost of a jukebox play down to a dime, if that
is what it is these days.
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value to an author-they can be easily overridden and ignored,
especially when more general economic claims for social efficiency or
increased social welfare are made. There must be a very compelling
reason to curtail rights as technological and social environments
change, and the reason must be a great social cost that is
unwarranted, unnecessary, and goes beyond the cost of the original
rights that early copyright laws anticipated.
This Article proposes that a curtailment of rights under
copyright laws would be acceptable only when three conditions are
met. First, the ideals identified under the original recognition of
rights, i.e. to encourage authorship and the creation of literary and
artistic works, would be at stake if rights were expanded. Second, a
competing right (and not a social goal) would be abridged if the right
were to be expanded. Third, there would be a cost to society that
would go far beyond the cost paid to grant the original rights under
copyright if the rights were to be expanded. This three-tenet test
stresses the importance of rights and the need to take copyright
seriously. Where the rights under copyright can be undermined and
ignored easily, authorship will be affected because the original rights
that authors had over their works would appear to be a sham, which
in turn results in disrespect for original works of authorship.
V. DEFENDING THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
This Article recognizes that the role that copyright law has in
encouraging the creation of literary and artistic works ultimately
contributes to the larger social goal of encouraging education,
research, and access to information. The convergence and
development of information and communication technologies has a
significant impact on how literary and artistic works are created and
used. From these developments, there is a recognized need to
maintain the rights of authors and creators of creative works while
ensuring that the public's need for access to these works is met.112
112. For an article emphasizing the public's need to access works of authorship, see
Litman, supra note 61, at 966.
[Tihe very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea. Composers
recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their characters on bits
and pieces drawn from real human beings and other playwrights' characters; novelists
draw their plots from lives and other plots within their experience; software writers
use the logic they find in other software; lawyers transform old arguments to fit new
facts; cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage
in the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining what is already 'out there'
in some other form. This is not parasitism: it is the essence of authorship.
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However, lawmakers must not lose sight of the individual author's
rights under copyright law, which should trump social or utilitarian
goals if the law is to be taken seriously as an institution designed to
promote progress of science and arts through works of authorship. An
author should have the right to exercise his individual rights under
law even if it affects social welfare by increasing access cost: if the
author's integrity in the work as an original work of authorship is to
be preserved in order to protect the author's creative expression and
society's ability to verify the veracity of a work, the author's individual
right must prevail over social welfare. Undermining the rights of
authors in favor of the public interest will destroy the copyright
system as an institution designed to encourage authorship. As rights
expand simultaneously with the development of new information and
communication technologies, society bears a cost as the maximization
of collective welfare through the copyright system is compromised.
However, as the three-tenet test for the curtailment of the author's
rights demonstrates, the loss to society from an expansion of
individual author's rights will be, at most, imaginary and marginal. 113
This is because the costs of a temporary monopoly over works remain
the same even as rights expand. 114 That portion of the copyright
equation does not change. Transaction costs decrease as technologies
converge to narrow the gap between author and user.115 Additionally,
when the individual author's rights expand together with the
development of new technologies in the networked economy, the cost
to society from the expansion of those rights remains low. Thus, it
would be a grave mistake on the part of the legal system to abridge
rights under copyright as technology develops based on the premise
Id.; see also Dean Ellinson & Eliezer Symonds, Australian Legislative Protection of Copyright
Authors' Honour, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 623 (2001) (examining the concept of the author's "honour"
within the context of Australian moral rights legislation); Dawn C. Nunziato, Justice Between
Authors, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (2002).
113. See infra Part VI.
114. The anticipated social cost when the Statute of Anne granted a copyright to authors
for 14 years to print books-the reduced access to content in books for the duration of the
copyright-remains the same 300 years later. The social cost resulting from the increase of
rights to cover the right to print, distribute, make derivatives, etc. for seventy years after the life
of the author is still reduced social access to content for the duration of the copyright. The cost of
the grant of exclusive rights has not become greater: they remain the same because society bears
the same costs for negotiating access rights to use works in ways protected by the statute. The
expansion of rights has not created costs that were not anticipated by the decision to grant rights
over works.
115. Alina Ng, Copyright's Empire: Why the Law Matters, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
337, 366-69 (2007) (discussing the role of technologies in correcting market failures facilitating
greater connection between authors and the users of their works).
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that there will be an increased cost upon society from an expansion of
those rights.
This Article aims to bring attention back to the basic ideologies
of copyright despite the raging debates on the far-reaching effects of
private rights in the networked economy.116 To not lose sight of what
the copyright system aims to achieve, which is the creation of an
environment where authorship can flourish so that literary and
artistic works can be produced for public benefit, 1 7 is important in the
digital age. Ultimately, the public benefits from the availability of
literary and artistic works in a robust copyright system because the
system itself provides the necessary balance between competing rights
of individual authors, who at times create for non-economic reasons,
and their audiences, which include users of their works and new
authors seeking inspiration and ideas. By adopting the copyright
system, as an institution designed to facilitate original authorship,
society implicitly trusts the law to take its hopes for the future and
aspirations for a better world into account. Society also trusts the law
to recognize and protect the various communities that have built up
around the legal system. Any change in copyright law will be in the
right direction if this is acknowledged by those who make and design
the laws. The law should not be as interested in recognizing
commercial interests in content and creative works, protecting
infrastructure that carry those works, or enclosing information and
knowledge in the public in the narrow sense.118 The law should be
more interested in ensuring that certain conditions exist to encourage
authorship, one of which is the author's individual right to control how
116. James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 342-343.
The Clinton Administration also supported a "Database Treaty," which would have
introduced into American law a quasi-property right over facts. In the face of intense
resistance, much of it focusing on the devastating effect such a regime could have on
research, debate, and public discourse, the treaty proposal was dropped but a
domestic bill was immediately introduced in its place. The examples go on and on,
ranging from the PTO's support for far-reaching, anti-dilution trademark legislation
that could reduce parody and criticism of famous companies, to the regulation of
domain names on the Internet, to the attack on fair use and first sale in the digital
context, or the extension of the copyright term.
Id.
117. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 109 (1991), reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 302 ("Copyright in a word, is about
authorship. Copyright is about sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an individual
to carve out of thin air and devouring labor, an Appalachian Spring, a Sun Also Rises, a Citizen
Kane.").
118. Id. C'[C]opyright is not about protecting authors of publishers, nor is copyright
singularly about securing authors' welfare or consumers' welfare. Copyright is not about
bolstering international trade balances, nor is it about protecting art, high or low.").
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the public uses his work to preserve authorial integrity. 119 The law
must also have regard for the number of communities and communal
interests that share and build upon commonly held content in the
networked economy. Individual authorial rights under the law should
not be expanded where the social cost for new authors to use existing
works as inspiration to create new works will exceed the original cost
that the legislature anticipated when first granting the right. How far
a right expands must ultimately depend on the cost that society bears
for the expansion.
Professor Dworkin, in Law's Empire, emphasizes that law is
not merely about rules, principles, and judge-made law, but rather
about society's attitude toward the law and its interpretation of, and
belief in, the legal system. 120 Individual rights under copyright law
cannot be abridged simply because society feels an increased invasion
of the collective welfare of having access to literary works. To abridge
rights so easily suggests that the initial recognition of the right was
not genuine and that the legislature gave the right as a matter of
convenience. The unfortunate effect of an abridgment of rights will be
public disregard of and disrespect for the copyright system as an
institution to create the conditions needed for original authorship to
occur and protect the process of creative production by individual
authors. Professor Dworkin explains:
Law's empire is defined by attitude, not territory or power or process .... It is an
interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest sense. It is a
protestant attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his public
commitments to principle are, and what these circumstances require in new
circumstances. The protestant character of law is confirmed, and the creative role of
private decisions acknowledged, by the backward-looking, judgmental nature of judicial
decisions, and also by the regulative assumption that though judges must have the last
word, their word is not for that reason the best word. Law's attitude is constructive: it
aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a
better future, keeping the right faith in the past. It is, finally, a fraternal attitude, an
expression of how we are united in community though divided in project, interest and
conviction. That is, anyway, what law is for us: for the people we want to be and the
community we aim to have.
12 1
Perhaps there is a need for society to understand copyright
laws in the same light. As an institution that aims to provide the best
route to the future, copyright laws must ensure that the proper
conditions for authorship exist so that society's welfare is maximized
through the creation of diverse forms of literary and artistic works. It
is true that the creative community is united in spirit to ensure that
119. Id.
120. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 408-409 (1986).
121. Id. at 413.
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the best conditions for authorship exist, even if it is divided on the
best way to achieve this. When society recognizes and understands
that the rights that the law gives authors are important to encourage
authentic and original authorship, and truly lie at the heart of the
social goal of maximizing collective welfare, the answer to the present
debate about rights in the networked economy when users are also
authors of literary and artistic works becomes clear. The debate of
balancing private rights against public interests misses the point,
which is that the proper conditions for authorship must exist before
literary and artistic works can be created for the public. This can only
happen when society takes copyright law as an institution designed to
facilitate original authorship seriously.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that the copyright system has a
larger role to play in the networked economy than in the analog world.
The copyright system serves the important function of connecting
authors with their audiences through the market. This function in the
analog world serves to allow efficient transfers of rights in literary and
artistic works to take place. In the digital world, the function of the
copyright system of connecting authors with their audiences serves to
recognize original authorship and protect ownership rights in literary
and artistic works, especially when communal and collaborative uses
of works raise moral and ethical concerns about the social uses of
particular works of authorship or art. 122 The sustainability of the
networked economy, when users increasingly become authors, is
heavily dependent on a strong and robust copyright system that
protects the individual rights of the author. Yet, there is no denying
the tension between private rights and public interests that lie at the
heart of copyright jurisprudence. As authors and users of creative
works have become more empowered through new technologies, the
Internet being a prime example, monopoly rights over the use of
intellectual and creative works have extended globally to include
transmission rights, public communication rights, and broadcasting
122. While social uses of works of visual arts are subject to the moral rights of the author,
the Visual Artists Rights Act applies only to paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures in a
limited edition of 200 copies or less that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2006). Ideally, a copyright system should protect all creative works
through the rights of attribution and integrity to ensure that an author's creative expression is
not modified or altered in a way that is objectionable to the author, and which contain the
author's identification to provide society with the ability to verify the veracity of information.
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rights. 123 Rights expand as legal responses to social, cultural, and
market changes brought about by converging information and
communications technologies. Similarly, there is an increasing need
to identify the proper allocation of entitlements in literary and artistic
works among authors, publishers, and the public at large, particularly
as these entitlements affect the ability of society to have access to
information for education, research, and general development.
As society has greater access to and use of creative materials in
novel ways through new communication and digital technologies,
there is a need to rethink the fundamental purposes of the copyright
system, evaluate the legal implications of rights expansion, and
consider if the best response to rights expansion is to abridge rights in
literary and artistic works. This Article suggests that there is a need
to recognize that individual rights, protected through copyright laws,
serve to encourage diverse forms of authorship. Furthermore, it is
more important to allow these rights to expand under law and not
abridge them to protect a social goal or public interest. The reason for
this is that the recognition of authorial rights under copyright laws
promotes respect for original authorship and sustains the production
of creative works for society. Individual rights should not be
undermined until and unless the expansion of the right imposes a cost
to collective social welfare that goes beyond the cost that society
originally paid in the grant of rights to authors under copyright laws.
The right balance within copyright law is a difficult question.
The balance that copyright law strives to achieve is often missed for
the larger socio-economic and developmental goals that advocates of
social justice and the development agenda put forth, or product
investment goals that copyright owners defending economic
investments in the production of creative works advocated. Both
arguments present valid points of view. On the one hand, anyone who
has invested time and money in producing new works wants to be able
to prevent others from unfairly profiting from their effort. Creative
works pose a classic public good problem, where non-paying members
may easily free-ride on the provision of the goods to paying members
of society. 124 Free riding will continue to exist with the creation of
123. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186
U.N.T.S. 152, 36 I.L.M. 65, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_
wo033.html.
124. Lemley, supra note 49, at 1050-1051.
Information is what economists call a pure 'public good,' which means both that its
consumption is nonrivalrous-my use of an idea does not impose any direct cost on
you-and that it is not something from which others can easily be excluded. Precisely
because its consumption is nonrivalrous, information does not present any risk of the
tragedy of the commons. It simply cannot be 'used up.' . . . we should not therefore be
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creative works unless laws are passed to allow owners of copyrighted
works to prevent members of society from using the goods without
paying for it. On the other hand, the public requires access to works
for learning, education, and use as building blocks of creativity to
develop new works of authorship and art. Here, advocates of the
public domain resist rights expansion in literary and artistic works
because of the restrictions that exclusive rights place on the freedom
to use content for the purposes of progress. 125
This Article acknowledges the validity and legitimacy of the
arguments, and recognizes that there are specific rights and interests
that private right holders and public interest groups strive to protect.
However, this Article suggests that the copyright system provides the
freedom that is necessary for the public to have access to creative
works. It also suggests that a true understanding of copyright law
removes the necessity to debate the boundaries between private rights
and public goals, even as new technologies appear to change the
balance between private and public interests. The information age
and the networked economy provide an opportunity for us to
reexamine the fundamental purposes of copyright law and
demonstrate that the balance between rights and access exists within
the law.
At the heart of copyright jurisprudence is the idea that, when
authors are encouraged to produce original, authentic works of
authorship, the availability of diverse forms of literary and artistic
works for society's use in the creation of new works to promote
progress of the sciences and useful arts increases social welfare. The
pursuit of an answer to the balance between authors' rights and users'
interests in copyright law cannot be isolated from political philosophy
about individual and collective rights, duties, and obligations. The
inextricable link between copyright law and the larger moral
questions on rights and responsibilities stems from the conception of
copyright as an institutional and legal right that is given to authors of
literary and artistic works to produce works of authorship to meet a
social need.
The rights of authors in works, however, do not compete, and
should not be seen as competing, with larger social goals, as is
particularly worried about free riding in information goods. It is not that free riding
won't occur with information goods; to the contrary, it is ubiquitous. Everyone can use
E=mc 2, the words of Shakespeare, or the idea of the tragedy of the commons without
compensating their creators.
Id.
125. Supra notes 62-65.
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assumed in present copyright debates and discourses. 126 The present
situation is not a question of balancing private interests and social
goals because there is no real balance to achieve between a private
property right belonging to the author of a work and a public goal to
further the progress of science and the useful arts. These are not
conflicting rights but rather complementary institutional goals of the
copyright legal system. Society should refrain from asking whether
rights have been inflated to the extent that the public right to access
works is restricted because a balance cannot be readily drawn between
private rights and social goals. Individual rights and social goals are
not in actual conflict. Instead, the discussion should focus on
achieving a balance between different rights when a policy choice
must be made between two equally legitimate and competing rights,
e.g., a user-author's property right in his literary and artistic creation
against a copyright owner's statutory right to reproduce the work or
make derivatives. When society's rights as a whole are involved for
the progress of science and the useful arts, for example, the question is
not where the proper balance between two competing interests lies but
how private institutionalized interests further this public goal. Society
must recognize that there is a clear difference between collective goals
and private interests, and between society's rights and the rights of
members of society.
Hopefully, the various parts of this Article have demonstrated
that, when users of literary and artistic works are also authors of new
works, the law must acknowledge that protecting the individual rights
of the author is paramount in sustaining a creative culture in the
networked economy. Otherwise, authors in the digital age, writing for
non-economic reasons, may lose the incentive to collaborate and create
works for the community in which they belong. The idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use doctrine demonstrate that non-protectable
ideas, as well as protectable portions of expressive content, may be
126. Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing the Author-Self Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright
Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 207. 208 (2007).
The theoretical framework of intellectual property law, and copyright law in
particular, is premised upon liberal and neo-liberal assumptions. At the core of
copyright's functionality are the concepts of private rights, property, ownership,
exclusion, and individualism. At the core of copyright's justifications are the concepts
of individual entitlement or desert, on one hand, and economic rationality and self-
interest on the other. Within this model, authors are individuated, proprietary
personalities with a claim to ownership of their intellectual works; these works are
the original, stable, and propertizable results of the authors' independent efforts. Far
from a situated, communicative act, the authorial activity presupposed by intellectual
property is an individual act that produces a commodifiable thing and, of course, a
right against all others in relation to that thing.
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used within legally defined boundaries as building blocks for new
forms of creativity. These are illustrations that there are, within the
law itself, mechanisms to encourage creative activity and diverse
forms of authorship.
Where the expansion of private rights appears to undermine
public or social goals, a three- tenet test is proposed to determine
when extension of rights under copyright is not acceptable. This test
is especially appropriate when the effect on the public's rights to
access creative works for learning and education is a significantly
higher cost than the cost anticipated by the legislature when the
rights were first given to authors. Finally, this Article defends the
copyright system as being effective in achieving the balance between
private rights and public interests. The copyright system provides the
legal solution to many of the economic, political, and social questions
that face society as technology develops and society changes.
Technological development and social change is not the root cause of
the problems encountered in the copyright system. The social,
economic, and political issues that arise from the changing
environment as technology develops, new markets emerges, and
Internet usage grows may not be the consequence of expanding rights
in literary and artistic works but rather a misunderstanding of the
nature of the law and the ideals it strives to achieve. This Article
concludes by offering a different perspective to the discussions taking
place today by highlighting the need to have property rights to protect
the creative expression of the author and provide information about
the work to society, and suggesting that many of the questions we ask
today about the copyright system are answerable through a reference
to the ideals of copyright law as an institution designed to promote
progress. We may be surprised by the ability of the copyright system
to provide a fair system where authorship and creativity flourish to
the benefit of society when we look toward the history of the legal
system as well as cultural forces surrounding the law's development
for the answers to the questions posed today. In the digital world,
where users of creative works are also authors of new works, the law
must do two things: protect the creative expressions of the author
from unwanted modification and alteration of the work and ensure
that society has sufficient information to make an assessment as to
the veracity of the work. The future of the digital age is exciting as
more individuals are empowered to be engaged with civic discourses
taking place on Internet networks and communication technologies.
For copyright law, this means that authors-whether the original
creator of the work or a user interested in generating content-must
20101
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be protected before social welfare. It is only then that sustained
authorship can become an impetus for progress.
